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non-specialists alike. Admittedly, many of the details related to the appearance
and'publication of the books are dry and,'at times, tedious. Nonetheless, in
the concluding sections to eaclvchapter, Hegel skillfully demonstrates the'link
between the physical form of the novels and what these material characteristics
reveal about.Chinese society and culture throughout the ages. Thus, the book is
of value not only, to scholars of Chinese literature, but also to those specializing
in the history, material culture,'and art of imperial China. Comparatively, it will
be of particular importance to bibliophiles, art historians, and scholars with ah
interest in the technology of printing.
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Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen: Chinese Foreign Policy 'during the Cultural Revolution. (London: Kegan Paul International" 1998), xi + 252 pp.,"$ 93.50.
ISBN 0-7103-0580-X.
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Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen's latest book, explores the impact of the
Cultural Revolution on Chinese foreign poUcy.»The first of its four main chapters
examines the insertion of Cultural Revolution politics into the foreign policy
establishment, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The second chapter
traces ..the ideological presuppositions that guided Mao in his formulation of
policy,,and the remaining two chapters review the ways.by which the Cultural
Revolution spilled over into the, conduct of diplomacy and its effect upon bilateral relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Japan."
In the early phases of the Cultural Revolution the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
was decimated by„factional conflict that pitted younger members of the ministry
staff against their superiors and generated an atmosphere of intense fear, distrust and mutual suspicion. It was in many ways a microcosm of what was
happening elsewhere in the country, and as elsewhere the. result .was confusion,
paralysis, and a decided shift_to the left. Remembered by-many in_the. West as
the eminence grise of China's foreign policy establishment, one.finds here Premier Zhou Enlai scrambling to maintain an element of coherence and rationality
in China's external relations and to. protect some of his allies (notably Foreign
Minister Chen I).
With the foreign, policy apparatus in disarrays China's foreign affairs came to
be, dominated more than ever by Mao Zedong.-As Barnouin aridiYu point out,
some analysts in the West have, attempted to trace the foreign policy shifts of
the period to political struggle and differences of opinion held by.elite groups
with the Communist Party eliter Barnouin and Yu maintain, however, that from
the onset of the Cultural Revolution until trie mid- to late-, 1970s the main centers
of power within the Chinesej,.Commurust Party (e.g., the Politburo, and the
Central Secretariat) were-paralyzed, leaving foreign „policy in-the hands of a
"personal hierarchy" at the top of which sat Mao himself. Mao's ideas and personal views on international matters were the driving force guiding policy, and
Barnouin and Yu demonstrate that there was a correspondence" between shifts
in.policyand changes in Mao's thinking."Indeed; Mao's role as the Communist
Party's,undisputed foreign policy leader was institutionalized as early as 1943,
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and by 1949 he'had emerged as the dominant personality within a poUcy-making
constellation that placed heavy' emphasis on personal^ leadership: Thus,- Mao's
domination of-foreign policy was a manifestation of habits that were firmly in
place long before the Cultural Revolution was conceived: Such debates as there
were usually were confined to the application of principles laid down by him,
while the administration of foreign policy was fanned out to government or
party agencies.
As Map monopolized policy, his ideology played a decisive role in laying the
agenda. As is well known, whereas at first Mao had allied China with the Soviet
Union, by 1956 he had become disenchanted with the Soviets and decided that
China should take over leadership of the world revolution and aggressively promote the cause of international communism. By 1965, the process of radicalization had reached a peak: Mao identified US imperialism as a serious threat to
China, called for people's war to oppose it, and labeled the USSR a revisionist
state and a traitor to the. revolutionary cause. Thus, by the early stages of the
Cultural Revolution Chinese foreign policy was driven by Mao's conviction that
the world revolution was about to enter a new stage in which revolutionary
upheaval was sure to envelop the capitalist world_and deal it a crushing'blow.
The same revolutionary.ideology that factored prominently in the Cultural Revolution governed "China's contacts with the outside world, and the result was a
string of .foreign policy disasters such.as the Red Square Incident of January,
1967, and the,, burning of the'British mission in Beijing in August of the same
year.
Eventually, as the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution waned, Mao's ideological arid revolutionary preoccupations gave way to cooler, more rational calculations of China's national interest, and foreign policy was de-linked from domestic politics. Once again, it was'Mao himself who took the lead. By the late
1960s he had concluded that it was the Soviet Union, not the United States, that
presented the greatest threat to China's interests, and as a result there'was a
"sea-change" in China's foreign policy.Ideological polemics continued to play a
conspicuous role .in public, but behind the-scenes steps were taken to open
communication with the US 'and prepare the way for eventual rapprochement
Barnouini and Yu show, incidentally, that Mao's efforts in this regard were assisted by activity on the American side that gave Mao the opportunity to characterize the opening to the US as a Chinese response to a US initiative.
Much.of what Barnouin and Yu1 present is derived from secondary sources
already in print Their original contribution is limited to the first chapter which
deals .with: the internal effects of the Cultural Revolution upon the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs: There, the insights-are new and they are based largely upon
interviews with former Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff and rebel leaders that
were conducted in Beijing between 1991 and 1993.
The book contains an appendix that includes a chronology and twenty-eight
documents dating to the later phases of the Cultural Revolution, i.e., from 1967
to 1974, when Mao was attempting to stabilize the conduct of foreign relations
and change its direction -toward accommodation with the United States. Although; Barnouin and Yu do not analyze them, as such, they seem to reveal a
tendency for.Beijing leaders to employ ideological formulas for public consumpJAH 34/1 (2000)
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tion while in their communications with one another dealing with matters more
pragmatically." Apparently, despite the Cultural Revolution's encroachment upon
the foreign policy domain and its disruption of normal relations,' there remained
a core of leaders .who never entirely lost sight of China's national security needs.
Sacred Heart University
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Austin, Greg: China's Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and
National Development. (St. Leonard's: Allen and Unwin in association with Canberra: Department of International Relations and the Northeast Asia Area Program, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1998), xxxii + 415 pp., pbk $ 29.95. ISBN 1-86373-982-3.
The ultimate sovereign status of the island of Taiwan, China's principal offshore territory, is not questioned by any power capable of altering it, but lesser
islands are not uncontestedly Chinese. Japan contests the Senkaku Islands
northeast of Taiwan. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam contests the .Paracel
Islands, apex of a triangle whose base runs between .Vietnam and Hainan Island.
The broadcast Spratly Islands are contested by the Philippines and by Malaysia.
China draws cartographic claim to the Paracels and the Spratlys by enclosing
them within the great looping w-shaped line shown in Austin's Map 3. Speculating
on the ontology of the line in a lengthy footnote (p; 14), Austin suggests it originated in a map of April 1935 that emanated from interdepartmental committee
meetings charged by the Chinese government to "check and approve the names
of 132 islands, sand cays, submerged:reefs and shoals in the.South China Sea."
A Republic of China source says the line first appeared on a 1948 Chinese map;
a PRC source says it was a 1947 Chinese reaction to the 1945 Truman Declaration
which for the first time reckoned a nation's off-shore jurisdiction by its continental shelf. •< Austin says, "The legal, significance of this line should now be interpreted
more in the chauvinistic spirit with which the PRC and ROC governments of the
1950s and: 1960s approached questions of sovereignty, than as evidence of likely
policy.intent for the late 1990s. Traces'of chauvinistic spirit remain in PRC approaches to legal issues, but this has not been the dominant approach in Beijing
to law of the sea issues for some time. There is reason to believe that the PRC
might be prepared to abandon the w-shaped line in the South China Sea as unauthoritative, but it "will not make this position clear until it-sees just'what'the
negotiating positions of other countries are. and hence is able, to refine its own.
It'would probably prefer to give up this line late, in negotiations where the surrender could be presented as a concession." (p. 221)
Austin argues "that PRC claims to disputed offshore islands ... are motivated
primarily by a strong, unshakeable conviction that these territories legitimately
belong to China according to commonly accepted standards of international law"
(p. 4). Regarding the several claims, he concludes, "Beijing has an:undefeatable
claim-to sovereignty.over the.Paracel Islands; it has no defensible claim to the
SenkakuTsIands; it has a very strong claim to sovereignty of some,:possibly all
of the.Spratly Islands
" Inasmuch as the evidence cited throughout his book
JAH 34/1 (2000)

